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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

7737

AUGUST SCHRIEBER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court granting a petition made by Brigham E.
Roberts, District Attorney for the Third Judicial District,
to vacate and set aside an order of dismissal and discharge
in the case of State of Utah v. August Schrieber. The facts
essential to this appeal are as follows:
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The appellant, defendant below, a duly licensed and
registered naturopathic physician and surgeon in the State
of Utah, was on the 18th day of March, 1949, found guilty
by a jury of the crime of abortion (R. 40). On May 14,
1949, defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Charles
G. Cowley, sitting in the Third Judicial District Court,
to serve an indeterminate term of not less than two nor
more than ten years in the Utah State Prison. On the
same day Judge Cowley suspended sentence upon defendant
and placed defendant on probation under the custody of
the Adult Probation and Parole Department of the State
of Utah (R. 54). Subsequent to May 14, 1949, as a result
of the trial of said action, the defendant became seriously
ill, having what is known to the medical profession as
acute paroxysmal tachycardia, which is a disease caused
by extreme emotional stress.
During the period from May 14, 1949, to October 20,
1949, defendant suffered two heart attacks and his condition grew increasingly worse; he was unable to work
regularly and during a large part of said time was confined
to bed. Defendant was advised by his doctor, Dr. William
Henning, that there was a possibility of his health improving by going to a place with a lower altitude. At that time
defendant's six-year old son, Paul A. Schrieber, was also in
poor health, having an excessive number of white corpuscles in his blood for a boy of that age. Defendant believed that a change of climate would also benefit the health
of his son. During the period of his probation defendant
had completely and fully complied with the conditions of
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his probation and had conducted himself in a lawful and
creditable manner. He had resumed his practice to the
extent his poor health permitted.
In October, 1949, defendant made application through
his attorney Herbert B. Maw to the Third Judicial District
Court for an order setting aside his conviction, dismissing
the action and discharging him from custody. The motion
described the physical condition of the defendant and his
son and stated that his purpose for desiring to be discharged
from custody was to allow him to go to Florida with his
family for purposes of his health. The motion was accompanied by a report of the Adult Probation and Parole Department of the State of Utah, signed by its probation officer, stating that the defendant had completely and fully
complied with the conditions of his probation and had conducted himself in a lawful and creditable manner and that
the department would support whatever action the court
felt justified in taking regarding setting aside of defendant's conviction. The court, the Honorable Ray Van Cott,
Jr., discussed the motion on several occasions with the defendant's attorney, Herbert B. Maw. Defendant was not
present at any discussion except for the hearing on the
motion on October 20, 1949.
On October 20, 1949, the court heard the evidence in
support of defendant's motion, and made and entered its
order setting aside the conviction, dismissing the case and
discharging the defendant (R. 63, 64). The written order
provided as follows :
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"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
"STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
Case No.
13255

vs.
AUGUST SCHRIEBER,
Defendant.

"WHEREAS, the Adult Probation and Parole
Department of the State of Utah, which has charge
of the above-named defendant, August Schrieber,
has represented to the Court that said defendant has
complied with all of the conditions of his probation
since his conviction on March 18, 1949, and has indicated to the Court its concurrence in the action
herein taken and indicated by the attached report
and,
"Whereas, it appears to the Court that the said
defendant has very poor health, having recently suffered from two severe heart attacks which reduced
his blood pressure from a normal of 140 to 92 and
increased .his heart beats from a normal 72 to 126
and,
"Whereas, it appears that the defendant's six
year old son, Paul A. Schrieber, has poor health because of an excessive number of white corpuscles in
his blood, numbering about 13,600 while a normal
count for a boy his age is about 7,500 and,
"Whereas, it seems apparent that both the defendant and his son must move to a warmer climate
and a lower altitude if they are to enjoy a restoration of their health and,
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"Whereas, the defendant is a duly licensed and
registered naturopathic physician and surgeon not
only in the State of Utah but also in the States of
South Carolina and Florida and is anxious to permanently leave the State of Utah for the purpose of
taking up residence and carrying on his profession
in the State of Florida, a State which has the altitude and climate essential to the health of defendant
and his son and,
"Whereas, it is the opinion of the Court that it
will be compatible with the public interest if said
defendant is permitted to move to the State of Florida and carry on his profession in that State, now
therefore,
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the conviction.of the defendant, August
Schrieber, in the above-entitled case be ~et aside and
that the said action against said defendant be dismissed and that said defendant be discharged from
further supervision of the Parole Department of the
State of Utah.
"Dated the 20th day of October, 1949.
BY THE COURT:
jsj RAY VAN COTT,
JUDGE."
There is some disagreement as to the meaning of that
order and the circumstances and representations leading
up to it. It appears that defendant intended to go to Florida and remain there indefinitely depending upon whether
there was an improvement in his health. He believed that
he could resume his medical practice there. The court, the
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., had the impression that defendant intended and agreed to permanently depart from
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and remain outside of the State of Utah, despite the condition of his health; such a condition if it existed was not,
however, included in either the written order of October
20, 1949 nor the minute order of that date. There is nothing to indicate that defendant's purpose in leaving was
intended to be made a mandatory condition of the order.
Pursuant to the October 20, 1949 order defendant managed
to close the practice he had attempted to carry while ill
prior to the order ; he had closed his office, stored his
equipment, and packed his furniture, all within less than
two weeks. Communications were had with a man in Florida for procuring an apartment.
Defendant's health took a turn for the worse, however,
and from October 20, 1949 until around December 6, 1949
the greatest part of defendant's time was spent confined
to bed under the care of Dr. Henning. As soon as his health
permitted defendant left, with his family, for Florida. That
was on or about the 9th day of December, 1949 (R. 84).
In the fall of 1950 defendant's health was still poor.
During his eight-month stay in Florida he had been unable to work, and the greatest part of that stay was spent
by him in the hospital. His condition was in fact worse
than it had been in Utah. He decided to go to California
for treatments. On his way to California in November,
1950, defendant stopped over in Salt Lake City. On the
advice of his attorney he went to see the Honorable Albert
H. Ellett, presiding judge of the Third Judicial District
Court and the judge of the Criminal Division of said court.
His purpose in seeing the Judge was to determine the ex-
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act meaning and status of the order of October 20, 1949.
Judge Ellett recounted the occasion of defendant's visit
and inquiry as follows : ( R. 80-86.)
"The Doctor came in my office and told me he
could not longer live in Florida and was going to
California, and asked if he was in violation of the
order or law in passing through Utah.
"At that time I told him the case had been dismissed, he was a free man, he could pass through
Utah as often as he wanted to, and stay in Utah as
long as he wanted to-there was no order of the
court to prohibit it" (R. 103, 104).
Defendant went on with his family to California to see
if the climate and treatments would improve his health.
He was sick all the time he was in California. Early in
1951 defendant returned to the State of Utah with his
family. Defendant's health had not improved in Florida
and both defendant and his wife were anxious to remain
in Utah. His wife was a Utah girl by birth, having sisters
and an aged mother and father in the Salt Lake area. It
was her desire to be close to her family in the event that
anything happened to defendant.
From the time of his return in January, 1951, defendant's health showed a gradual improvement and it was
defendant's intention to resume his practice in the event
that his recovery continued.
On May 29, 1951, Brigham E. Roberts, District Attorney for the Third Judicial District Court, filed a petition
with the court to vacate and set aside the order of October
20, 1949, on the ground that the defendant had returned
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to Utah in violation of a condition of the order of dismissal
and on the further ground that said order made pursuant
to Section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended
by Chapter 24, Laws of 1943, was in conflict with Article
VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution (R. 57, 58). Defendant answered said petition denying that he was in
violation of the said order, denying that said order violated
Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and affirmatively alleging that the petition or order to show
cause issued pursuant thereto violated the 5th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States so placing defendant in double jeopardy and that the order of October 20,
1949 was final and absolute and divested the court of jurisdiction over defendant (R. 72, 73). The matter was set
down for hearing for June 9, 1951. At that time the defendant appeared with his attorneys Grant ~Iacfarlane and
Herbert B. Maw. The District Attorney for the Third
Judicial District, Brigham E. Roberts, appeared for the
State of Utah and offered as his sole and only witnesses
the defendant, August Schrieber and Herbert B. Maw. Defendant offered, in addition to himself, the following witnesses: LeV on Schrieber, his wife, Dr. William Henning
and Judge A. H. Ellett. In addition to the foregoing there
was offered and received in evidence a record of the proceedings leading up to and including the order of October
20, 1949. The court, by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr.,
having heard and considered the evidence, made his order
setting aside and revoking the order of October 20, 1949
and placing the defendant in the custody of the State Adult
Probation and Parole Department (R. 74). The pertinent
provisions of the court's opinion are as follows:
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"Mr. Macfarlane, I am of the opinion that the
act under which I took proceedings is constitutional.
I am not disturbed about that. But I have been for
a long time, since shortly after the granting of this
order, I have been of the opinion that I was misled,
I was imposed upon, and a fraud and deceit practiced
upon me by the defendant, and I think that is shown
by the fact that after he got the order that there was
no intention to move from the State of Utah. And
it was only when the whip that I used through Mr.
Maw, his attorney, by making threat I would take
action then that I propose to take now, that he even
left the State of Utah (R. 107, 108).

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"I want to say, with reference to the District
Attorney and Probation Department, they have no
responsibility in the granting of this order.
"I have heretofore stated in reference to parties
who asked me in reference to the matter, the obligation was solely mine, and I took it upon the fact I
thought I was doing the right thing, and I wasn't of
the opinion it would be a popular idea in taking the
action I did,-it would probably be an unpopular
idea.
"I don't believe the defendant ever did intend
to leave, and I am of the opinion that that court that
grants an order, and revokes a conviction and sets
it aside, upon fraud and deceit or misrepresentation
by a defendant, who has no intention to comply with
it, we are not divested of our authority in that regard (R. 108, 109).
"And everyone here today admits the reason
the order was signed was Dr. Schrieber had poor
health and had to leave the State of Utah, and he
had, with me, understood it would be permanent, he
was not coming back here to live, and practice, or
do otherwise (R. 110).
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*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"While it isn't called fraud, it all goes back to
the fact of what was the understanding, what has
been the compliance with that understanding, that is
my language, Mr. Macfarlane, when I used the words
'fraud and deceit' at the beginning of it, it shows
no intention of good faith, there was never any intention right at the inception of the order, ,there
was a violation, Dr. Schrieber was on his feet the
20th of October, 1949, and, from all I could tell,
· looked the same as he did today, and the other man
-the doctor testified today, the other man was here
in court, and all this illness occurred sometime after
the order of the court was granted (R. 111, 112).
"Mr. Macfarlane, that order isn't letter perfect.
There wasn't an understanding when he would leave,
that is what the law would imply, no date was fixed
when he should leave.
"The matter dragged on to the latter part of
October, all of November, and reports came to me,
by various people, the man was purported to be in
Salt Lake, and I would convey that to Governor
Maw, and he said, 'I will see Dr. Schrieber'. And
finally, I said to Governor Maw, 'This man isn't
leaving, and I am getting doubts about this matter'
(R. 112).
"Governor Maw, the reports I got during that
period of October, November and December, came
to me, I would say not from enemies of Dr. Schrieber,
but by officials of this State, and those persons I
am sure would not have any occasion to go to Dr.
Schrieber's home, and if he saw Dr. Schrieber it
would be on the street. I know the man, and I am
positive-he is here in the court-room-1 am practically sure he would never have any occasion to go
to Dr. Schrieber's home, whether he got his infor-
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mation directly by having seen him, or having someone tell him, I don't know which-but he was an
official of the State, and reported that to me. I have
never had a private citizen call me with reference
to this matter" (R. 114).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, THAT BEING A FINAL, UNCONDITIONAL AND VALID ORDER.

II.

THE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION UPON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT VACATED THE
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD AND SUFFICIENT GROUNDS
FOR REVOCATION.

III.

THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS FINDING AS TO FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION ON EXTRAJUDICIAL UTTERANCES
AND STATEMENTS.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO VACATE THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, THAT BEING A FINAL, UNCONDITIONAL AND VALID ORDER.

A.

The order of October 20 and the statute pursuant to
which it was made are valid.

Inasmuch as the trial court did not base its order vacating the order of October 20, 1949, on the invalidity of
the order and the statute pursuant to which it was made,
it does not seem necessary to discuss that question at length.
It is to be noted, however, that the invalidity of the statute was asserted by the District Attorney in his petition
to vacate the order as one of the grounds thereof, and a
brief discussion of that question appears appropriate.
The order of October 20, 1949 was made pursuant to
the following provisions of Section 105-36-17, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 24, Laws of 1943:

"* * * Where it appears to the court from
the report of the probation agent in charge of the
defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has
complied with the conditions of such probation, the
court may if it be compatible with the public interest either upon motion of the district attorney or of
its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside
the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant,
and dismiss the action and discharge the defendant."
Prior to the enactment of the 1943 amendment the
courts had no power to dismiss an action and discharge a
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defendant subsequent to sentence of said defendant solely
upon grounds of good behaviour and public policy. It seems
clear that the purpose of the amendment was to allow the
district courts to finally and completely discharge and
release a defendant and relinquish jurisdiction over him
where the conduct of the defendant during his term of
probation was in compliance with the terms of the probation and nothing appeared to show that defendant was not
ready to resume his position in society. Clearly the provision was intended as a benefit to a deserving defendant
as a means of rehabilitating him; it certainly was not intended as a means of restraining a defendant's rehabilitation by banishing him from the state.
The question is raised whether the above quoted amendment violates Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. It is apparent upon a reading of that section that the
amendment does not violate the constitutional provision.
Article VII, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides
as follows:
"Sec. 12 [Board of pardons. Respites and reprieves.]
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Justices of the Supreme Court and Attorney-General
shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions,
and with such limitations and restrictions as they
deem proper, may remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments,
subject to such regulations as may be provided by
law, relative to the manner of applying for pardons;
but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no
commutation or pardon granted, except after a full
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hearing before the Board, in open session, after previous notice of the time and place of such hearing
has been given. The proceedings and decisions of
the Board, with the reasons therefor in each case,
together with the dissent of any member who may
disagree, shall be reduced to writing, and filed with
all papers used upon the hearing, in the office of
the Secretary of State."
The critical words of Section 12 are "Until otherwise
provided by law." By this constitutional provision it was
manifestly intended that the legislature be empowered to
make subsequent changes and additions with respect to the
pardoning power and the power to discharge a defendant
from custody and terminate sentence. When the legislature made the 1943 amendment it was acting pursuant to
constitutional authority. Even if this were not the case it
is submitted that the courts would have the power pursuant
to legislative enactment to dismiss actions and discharge
defendants. There is technically a distinction to be drawn
between the power to pardon and commute sentence and
the power to dismiss an action and discharge a defendant
from jurisdiction. The latter has always been a judicial
power. The following authorities establish that such power
may be validly vested in the courts :
15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 449;
Annotation, 26 A. L. R., 400.
The record clearly shows that the court followed the
statute in considering and making its order of October 20,
1949. The requirements of Section 105-36-17 as to a favorable probation report were met. The report of the pro-
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bation officer affirmatively stated that defendant had complied with the conditions of his probation and had conducted
himself in a lawful and creditable manner and that the
probation office would support the action taken by the
court. The trial court's order was based upon findings that
defendant had complied with the conditions of his probation and dismissal of defendant and discharge of him was
compatible with the public interest. There is no evidence
to show that defendant was not, both on October 20, 1949
and subsequent thereto, deserving of an opportunity to
resume his position in society within the meaning and
purpose of said statutory provision. It seems justifiable
and extremely important, therefore, to emphasize that all
of the mandatory and substantive requirements and conditions for issuance of the order of October 20, 1949 existed
and were fulfilled. The order was, therefore, valid.

B.

The order of October 20, 1949 was final and unconditional and divested the court of the jurisdiction over
the d~fendant.

Neither the written order of October 20, 1949, signed
by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., nor the minute order
of the same date imposes as a condition of dismissal and
discharge that defendant be permanently banished from the
State of Utah. The charging portion of the October 20th
written order is found in the last paragraph, which provides
as follows:
"It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
that the conviction of the defendant, August Schrieber, in the above entitled case be set aside and that
the said action against said defendant be dismissed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
and that said defendant be discharged from further
supervision of the Parole Department of the State of
Utah."
The paragraphs prior to the above quoted paragraph of
the order merely recite that the statutory grounds for issuance of the order had been fulfilled and defendant's purpose for seeking the order.
There can be no question but what the defendant,
August Schrieber, had intentions of leaving the State of
Utah for purposes of his health and the health of his son
and that his intention was to remain away from the State
of Utah if his health demanded it. It is true, therefore,
that the defendant's purpose in applying for dismissal of
the action and discharge from custody was that he might
leave the state for his health. There is no evidence to show
that defendant agreed never to return to the State of Utah
and agreed that that be a part of the order. In order to
leave the state it was necessary for him to procure authority, and one manner for doing that was by the application
which he filed with the court. It is a mistake, however, to
distort and confuse defendant's object in procuring the
order of dismissal into a mandatory condition of the order.
Despite the clear and unqualified language of the order of October 20, 1949 and the minute order, the trial
court vacated the order on the ground that a condition
thereof, i. e. banishment from the State of Utah permanently, had been violated. The Judge stated that this condition constituted his understanding of the order. The error
of this result is apparent. It is a stringently enforced rule

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
that parole or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict, impeach, vary or explain judicial records, such
records importing verity.
32 C. J. S., Evidence, Section 865;
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1164;
Annotation, 10 A. L. R. 1502;
Annotation, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104.
Under the foregoing principle of law the courts have
uniformly held that the intention or understanding of a
court in making an order cannot be proved by parole evidence for the purpose of varying or contradicting or adding
to the clear and unambiguous language of the written
order;

Campbell v. Nunn, 78 Utah 316, 2 P. (2d) 899;
Northern Assurance Company of London v.
Grand View Building Association, 183 U.
S. 308, 22 S. Ct. 133 ;
Blue Mountain Iron and Steel Company v. Partner, 31 F. 57, (4th Cir.);
Krause v. Yorke, 89 F. Supp. 91;
Ex Parte Clark, 60 Cal. App. (2d) 21, 140 P.
(2d) 92;
Johnson v. State, 87 Ark. 45, 112 S. W. 143;
Boyd County v. Ross, 95 Ky. 167, 25 S. W. 8;
Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235, 40 Am. Dec.
135;
Ramis Heat and Power Company v. The City
of Seattle, 113 Wash. 95, 193 P. 233;
In re Kehl's Estate, 254 N. W. 639;
Lipsitz v. First National Bank, 288 S. W. 609;
Colonial Trust Company v. Hill County, 27 S.
w. (2d) 144;
Brandon v. Brandon, 135 S. W. (2d) 929;
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Brooks v. Miami Bank and Trust Co., 156
Southern 757;
Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553, 17 Am. Dec. 609.
It seems clear from the foregoing authorities that it
was improper for the trial court to consider matters outside
the record and written order in determining whether or
not the order was conditioned upon permanent banishment
from the State of Utah. The court's ruling was based on
an oral understanding of the Judge as to the conditions of
the order. This understanding does not even assume the
weight and dignity of parole evidence. The Judge's statement as to his own understanding was not subject to any
of the rights which the law gives to the defendant. It was
not subject to cross-examination and was not submitted
to an impartial trial of fact. It is submitted that the trial
judge's finding based on his own understanding is clearly
error. The court can readily conceive of the miscarriage of
justice which would ensue from a practice whereby a judge
could change the terms of a written order or judgment on
the basis of his own memory and understanding as to the
conditions of such order or judgment long after the issuance
of the same and without availing a party of the opportunity
to challenge or test the verity of the understanding.
Certainly if the written order of October 20, 1949, is
considered on its face it is final and unconditional and
divested the court of jurisdiction over defendant. It would
follow on well settled principles that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to subsequently vacate it and set it aside.
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A decision which is substantially on all fours with the
instant case is In re Flint, ... Utah ... , 71 Pac. 531. In
that case defendant was convicted of the crime of forgery
on February 25, 1902. The court made an order directing
that defendant appear March 5, 1902 for sentence. The
case was continued and March 12, 1902 fixed as the time
for pronouncing sentence. On March 12 the court made the
following order :
"The defendant having been convicted of the
crime of forgery, and being now before the court
to receive sentence, and the court being sufficiently
advised, it is ordered that sentence be, and the same
is hereby suspended, and the defendant permitted to
go upon his own recognizance."
That was in effect an order of dismissal and discharge.
Thereafter, the District Attorney made a motion for an
order directing defendant to appear for sentencing. The
court ordered defendant to appear for sentencing on January 12, 1903. The defendant appeared and objected to
further proceedings on the ground that the order was final
and that the court thereby divested itself of jurisdiction.
The court overruled defendant's objection and sentenced
defendant to a term of one year in prison and committed
him to the proper officers.
Defendant thereupon filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus setting forth the foregoing facts. The Supreme Court granted the petition and upon hearing ordered
that defendant be discharged. The court held that the order
of March 12, 1902 was in effect an order of dismissal and
discharge and that once having discharged defendant the
court could not reassume jurisdiction. The court said:
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"But we know of no rule or principle of law
whereby a court can indefinitely suspend sentence,
keep a defendant in a state of suspense and uncertainty and long after he has been discharged from
custody have him rearrested and impose a sentence
of either fine or imprisonment upon him.
"When the court suspended judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant discharged from
custody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him and
all subsequent proceedings in the premises were unauthorized by law, and are therefore void."
C.

The condition of banishment which the Judge allegedly
imposed upon the order of October 20, 1949 was co'Y!r
trary to law and public policy and void.

The great weight of authority is that a court does not
have the power to sentence or order a defendant banished
permanently from the state.

People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N. W. 95;
State v. Baker, 58 S. Car. 111, 36 S. E. 501;
Haggett v. State, 101 Miss. 269, 57 Southern
811;
People v. Lopez, 253 P. 169;
Ex Parte Scarborough, 173 P. (2d) 825.
The compelling reasons for the above stated principle
are obvious. A sentence or order of a court banishing a
defendant from the state is prohibited by public policy as
tending to incite dissension among the states, provoke retaliation, and disturb the fundamental equality of political
rights among the states which is the basis of the Union.
In addition to the foregoing reasons, appellant submits
that banishment permanently from the State of Utah would,
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if imposed as a valid condition of the order of October 20,
1949, impose upon defendant a greater punishment than
his crime warranted. Although appellant has been unable
to find any cases, it is submitted that in principle such a
holding clearly violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it subjects defendant to
double jeopardy by imposing a new and different sentence
upon defendant than the one originally ordered.
There is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
of this state which allows or empowers a court to permanently banish a citizen and in doing so increase the severity
of the punishment prescribed by statute for his crime.
Therefore, such a condition, if it were in fact a part of the
order of October 20, 1949, would be invalid and unenforceable.

II.
THE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION UPON
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT VACATED THE
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 1949, IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVENT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD AND SUFFICIENT GROUNDS
FOR REVOCATION.
The trial court was required to find and did find, in
order to grant the order of October 20, 1949, that defendant
had complied with the conditions of his probation and that
dismissal of the action and discharge of defendant were
compatible with the public interest. Those were the substantive mandatory requirements of the statute for issuance
of the order. Appellant does not believe that the October
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20th order could be attacked even with respect to a material substantive requirement for issuance of the order, but
that is a matter which need not be considered here. There
has not been any fraud, misrepresentation or mistake either
alleged or proved with respect to any matter, and particularly with respect to the material substantive requirements for issuance of the order. The case seems to represent the very situation for which the statutory amendment
of 1943 was adopted. It is appellant's position therefore
that because the grounds for vacating the order do not go
to the material and substantive requirements for the issuance of the order that they are insufficient to justify
the trial court's ruling.

III.
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS FINDING AS TO FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION ON EXTRAJUDICIAL UTTERANCES
AND STATEMENTS.
As appears obvious from the record, the court's order
of vacation and revocation was based on its belief that
defendant had misrepresented to the court concerning his
intentions to leave the State of Utah. Whatever the law
may be with respect to fraud and misrepresentation constituting grounds for revocation of an order it is not necessary to determine that question here. The alleged misrepresentation and fraud were found by the court not on
the basis of any evidence at the hearing, nor was misrepresentation alleged in the petition of the District Attorney
for the Third Judicial District. To the contrary, the testi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
mony of the defendant, his wife, and his doctor and his
attorney clearly indicate that defendant made plans to leave
and was in extremely poor health and that he did leave
the state as soon as his health permitted. Certainly, neither
the trial court nor any other court would or could require
that a man under the care of a doctor and confined to bed
prejudice his life by leaving his doctor's care and his sickbed and travel several thousand miles. What is the evidence,
then, upon which the court found that defendant had misrepresented? This finding was based solely upon the Judge's
understandings as he had concluded them from the statements of an unidentified public official ; and the Judge did
not know whether the statements of the unidentified official were based on personal observations or information
acquired from others. Is there any question but what it is
error for a court to make a finding of misrepresentation
and fraud on the basis of information received from a
person who is not named, not sworn and not examined by
defendant's counsel? The authority is clear that a court
cannot vacate an order except upon competent evidence
showing that grounds for vacating it exist.

Malone v. Topper, 125 Md. 157, 93 A. 897;
McKee v. Verner, 239 Pa. 69, 86 A. 646;
People Ex rel. Sweitzer v. Chicago, 363 Ill. 409,
2 N. E. (2d) 330;
United States v. Ginik, 2 Black (U. S.) 610, 17
L. Ed. 352.
It is submitted that the court's order was not made upon
competent evidence.
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A finding of misrepresentation and fraud being the
basis for the trial court's order of revocation and that finding being based not on competent evidence but upon extrajudicial statements and understanding, it is submitted that
the court was in error.
CONCLUSION
It appears clear that prior to October 20, 1949, defend-

ant had every right to remain in the State of Utah and
practice his profession. There was no law or order of the
court to prevent him from doing so. The only requirement
imposed on him was that he comply with the conditions of
his probation, which he did fully and creditably. Defendant wished to leave the state for his health and that of his
son. To do so the law required that he procure permission.
He sought the permission in an application made to the
court. The court by. its written order unconditionally and
finally discharged defendant and dismissed the action. But
if the trial court's understanding of the order is imposed
upon it, the order resulted in restricting defendant's liberties and depriving him of rights he unquestionably had
before its issuance. It is submitted that the written order
was final and unconditional, that it was error for the trial
court to add to it on the basis of an oral understanding of
the Judge, it was error for the court to find fraud and
misrepresentation on the basis of incompetent evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

